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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF

THE STATE OF UTAH

THE FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF LOGAN,
OF LOGAN, UTAH, a National
Banking Association,
Plaintiff-Appellant
vs.

No.
10621

WALKER BANK & TRUST COMPANY,
a corporation,
Defendant-Respondent

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF

ARGUMENT
POINT I
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF SUPPORTS APPELLANT'S
POSITION THAT IT IS THE RESPONSIBILITY OF
LEGISLATURE TO CHANGE THE LANGUAGE OF
THE BRANCH BANKING STATUTE.
In its argument in Walker Bank v. Taylor, 15 U. 2d

:234, 390 P. 2d 592 (which argument was adopted by the
Comt), Walker Bank contended that the Utah Branch

Banking Statute was plain and unambiguous and administrntive interpretations should not induce the court to
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vary "the very unambiguous terms of our branch hanki11rrh
statutes." This conclusion was bolstered by the fact th,tt
:-he state legislature specifically provided in 1953 that:
"From and after the effective elate of this act no unit
bank and no branch shall be established or authorized to conduct a banking business except as hercinbefore in Section 7-3-6 expressly provided." (Section
7-3-6.3, Utah Code Annotated, 1953).
\Valker Bank now contends that the Court should
vary the plain words of the Statute because a Federal
District Court (Michigan National Bank v. Saxon, Civil
No. 821-62, D. D. C. July 25, 1962, not reported) said
that a drive-in facility 500 feet from the main office was
not an additional branch if it is not operated as "a separate
and independent office operating in the same way as
branch banks generally operate" even though such wording is not contained in the branch bank definition.
Two other Federal District Courts disagreed with
the conclusion reached in the Michigan National Bank
case. In State Chartered Banks in Washington v. Peoples
National Bank, Civil No. 6338, W. D. \Vash., February 28,
1966 a proposed facility 260 feet from the principal office
having a different address was held to be a branch even
though presumably not operated as a separate and independent office. And a drive-in facility 290.52 feet from
the main bank building and separated by businesses and
by an alley was held to be a branch in Jackson v. First
National Bank, 246 F. Supp. 134 (M. D. Ga. 1965).

If courts interpreting the same language cannot agree

as to the circumstances that are necessary to vary the

-2-

d:lin words of the legislatme, can it be said that the
lc'<>islatme
must have intended that an additional office,
0
homing a separate teller, who receives deposits and pays
, ·lwcks, who is separated from the main branch banking
off ice by an alley and a separate office is not an additional
offi<'C' for receiving deposits and paying checks and there{orc a hrm1ch, The fact that Respondent is able to find
l1ui one F('rlcral Court that has taken the liberty of extenclrng the plain language of the legislature seems to imply
that the cldinition of "additional office" or "branch" is
phin and that the lPgislature intended that the State
Ru1k Commissioner should control all expansion of exist111g lacilitics which involve establishing additional offices
11 h( re deposits are received or checks paid.
Since the
l :tah definition and the Federal definition of branch
hanb are identical, we submit that the disagreement
among Federal Comts as to the interpretation thereof
illflicatcs any extension or modification of the language
is ~ problem for the legislatme.
1

Walker Bank also contends that because the State
B:n1k Commissioner has ignored the opinion of the At1orney Gc11eral (Novemher 8, 19.57) and has not contested expansion hy state banks, that this Court should
acquiesce in his failure to take action. This position was
rejPcted in \Valker Bank v. Taylor, supra.
Walker Bank concedes that the Attorney General of
FtJh in 1957 stated that a separate facility, 141 feet from
1ltc main hanking house was a branch under the plain
language of our branch banking statutes. But Walker
ll:nk says we should ignore this opinion because a new
State Rrnk Commissioner took no action when Continental

-3-

Bank and Beehive State Bank established drive-in facilities
separate from their existing bank. Of course, action by
the State Bank Commissioner against these two banks
would have accomplished little since both banks had an
unlimited right to branch in Salt Lake City under thr
provisions of our statute and such offices could have been
authorized under the express provisions of Section 7-3-6.
·walker Bank also contends that because the Comptroller of the Currency has taken no action against First
Security Bank in its establishment of drive-in facilities,
this Court should enlarge the meaning of the Utah statutf'
on branch banking. The Comptroller's position that he
is not bound by state procedural restrictions on branch
banking is well known (see Walker Bank v. Saxon, 234 F.
Supp. 74, .'352 F. 2d 90, cert. granted 34 U. S. Law Weck
.1377 No. 875; and First National Bank of Smithfield v.
Saxon, 352 F. 2d 267). Obviously the Comptroller is
not going to take action against First Security Bank if it
means he may have to take a position contrary to the
position for which he is presently contending.
POINT II
THE OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
CITED BY RESPONDENT SUPPORT APPELLANT'S
POSITION.
Walker Bank contends that the Attorney General's
opinion of March 25, 1966 modifies the opinion of November 8, 1957 and should be followed by this Court. But
while some Attorneys General in other states have found
rights not granted by legislatures and have caused legis-
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l:itures
mobile
within
by the

to more specifically define conditions for autobanking, the Utah Attorney General has stayed
the statutory definition of a branch as interpreted
Utah Supreme Court.

In 19.57 the Attorney General said that a separate
building separated from the main banking house by 141
fret and four offices in which a teller was housed for
receiving deposits is a branch. In 1966 the Attorney
General said a building separated only by an alley, and
not housing a teller, but into which a customer may place
money to be transported to the teller located inside the
main banking house through a pneumatic tube where the
teller is able to watch the entire transaction by television,
is not a branch.

The significant difference between the two opinions
is in 1957 the checks were paid and deposits were received outside the main banking house. In 1966 the
depmit was received inside the main banking house. The
distinction between the bank's agent being outside the
main banking house and a transaction taking place within
the main banking house was the basis on which the Court
found that the outside agent was carrying on a banking
business in Continental Bank & Trust Co. v. Taylor, 14
Utah 2d 370, 384 P. 2d 796, and was therefore a branch.
If the Attorney General had given a different opinion in
1.966 there may have arisen some question as to whether
a bank could receive mail deposits since the customer
loses possession of the money outside the main banking
l1ouse. But in mail deposits and in the pneumatic tube
arr:rngement considered by the Attorney General the
deposit is received by the bank's teller inside its banking
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house before the depositor receives credit therefor which
is all that the branch hanking statute requires.
But in \Valker Bank's additional office at 35 East
1st North both the customer and the teller are outside tlw
main branch banking house located at 102 North .1\fain
when the deposit is made. It is true that the deposit is
later transferred to the main banking house, but the loan
papers were also later transferred to the main banking
house in the Continental Bank case, supra. But the Conrt
said:
"\Ve consider the transaction completed and the
'monev lent' at the time .. the executed note and
mortg~ge arc delivered to the representative of the
Bank . . ."
Certainly it cannot be argued that the check is not paid
when the customer delivers the check to the teller at :3.5
East 1st North and she delivers cash to him. It seems
obvious that when the customer delivers cash to the tcll::T
at 35 East 1st North and she receipts for the cash in the
depositor's pass book that a deposit is made. Therefore
since admittedly Walker Bank receives deposits and pa) s
checks at 35 East 1st North (Tr. 8) it is as much a branch
as in the Continental Bank case supra. And since it was
not established pursuant to authority of the State Bank
Commissioner (Resp. Br. p. 4), it is an unauthorized
branch bank under the laws of the State of Utah.
In seeking to make the situation as much like that
in the 1966 Attorney General's opinion as possible Walker
Rank emphasizes its claim that only an alley separates
the additional office from the main bank building (Resp.
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Br. pp. 3 and 7). Walker Bank seems to be conceding
that the Utah Branch Banking Statute does not authorize
,1 separate facility if separated both by an alley and one
additional office operated by others. If this is so, Judgment should be entered for the Plaintiff. Appellant's
attorney walks past the Utah Mortgage & Loan Real
Est1te office located at 15 East 1st North (between
\V;1lker Bank's branch at 102 North Main and its additim~al office at 3.5 East 1st North) every day. On August
15, 1966 Utah Mortgage & Loan were advertizing on the
~nrne sign that they have been using for years in the window of this office a five bedroom house in North Logan
for $22,500. Inside the office was an agent and secretary
who were receiving Utah Mortgage & Loan customers.
Respondent claims on page 7 of its brief that it must be
assnmed it will comply with the terms of the order of
the lower comt and it claims the lower court ordered it
to occupy the Utah Mortgage & Loan office when it
opened its drive-in facility for business. But the drive-in
facility and Utah Mortgage & Loan were both open for
husiness on August 15, 1966. All the lower Court's decree
provides is that the plaintiff's complaint is dismissed.
There is no bar in the court's decree against the continued
leasing of this office to Utah Mortgage & Loan or any
other person.

However, regardless of whether Respondent knows
if Utah Mortgage & Loan still occupies the office at 15
East 1st North, it is submitted that a separate office,
housing a teller who receives deposits and pay checks,
separated from the branch banking office (by a separate
business establishment at the time the complaint was
filed, at the time the court's decree was made, at the time
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the drive-in facility opened for business, and at the time
this brief is being written) by a right of way or alley for
the use of others, and a distance of 134 feet from thr
branch entrance at 102 North Main to the separate office
at 35 East 1st North, is a branch under the definition in
the Utah statute. It is appellant's position that under
previous decisions of this Court stating that our Branch
Banking statute is "plain and unambiguous" and "what
it does not expressly permit, it prohibits" (Walker Bank
v. Taylor, supra., and Continental Bank & Trust Co. v.
Taylor, supra.), opinions of the Utah Attorney General
which thus far have held that if the teller receives the
deposits at a place other than inside the main banking
office it is a branch, the better reasoned Federal cases
interpreting an identically worded Federal Statute (Jackson v. First National Bank, supra., and State v. Peoples
National Bank, supra.) which actually involved adverse
parties and not two parties desiring the same result as in
the case of Michigan National Bank v. Saxon, supra., and
for the other reasons stated in its briefs, such an additional
office is a branch bank under the definition contained in
Section 7-3-6, Utah Code Annotated, 1953.
Respectfully submitted,
Ted S. Perry
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant
106 Church Ave.
Logan, Utah

-8-

